The issues regarding emotions have been debated since ancient times, with Aristotle being a prominent contributor to the subject (Garcés & Giraldo, 2017). Although he did not explicitly formulate a theory of emotions, he left scattered outlines in several of his treatises (Trueba, 2009). Therefore, Aristotle emerges as a pioneer in attempting to rationally explain emotions (Quintanilla, 2007). For some, this might sound unusual or even impossible, as emotions were once considered inexplicable and almost magical forces. By attributing them to the gods, emotions were seen as uncontrollable and even irrational, existing in a distinct and immeasurable realm from the rational. However, Aristotle seeks a rational explanation by integrating cognitive elements, such as beliefs present when people experience emotions (Quintanilla, 2007). Thus, according to Trueba (2009), Aristotle's analysis of emotions responds to a particular philosophical interest and addresses specific problems.
In the treatise "On the Soul," the focus is on the relationship between the affections of the soul and the body (Trueba, 2009). Aristotle confronts the dilemma of determining whether there is an act or affection exclusive to the soul, paying special attention to passions and relying on the most recognized theories of his time. In correspondence with Trueba (2009), in ethical treatises, Aristotle addresses passions in the context of his virtue doctrine, while in "Poetics," he does so in relation to his analysis of pathetic tragedy.
Between Body and Soul: The Enigma of Emotions
In the treatise "On the Soul," the issue of passions or emotions is addressed concerning whether there is any act or affection of the soul that is proper to it (Trueba, 2009). Contemporary theories suggest two opposing definitions of emotions: for physicists, they are bodily phenomena, while for dialecticians, they are dianoetic or mental phenomena. Aristotle rejects both views, considering them partial explanations. The first focuses only on the material principle of affections, and the second addresses only the formal principle. In this sense, Aristotle questions the dialectical conception of emotions because soul affections seem to manifest in the body, such as valor, sweetness, fear, compassion, daring, as well as joy, love, and hatred. The body is simultaneously affected in these cases. However, according to Trueba (2009), this judgment is based on observation and experience.
Aristotle argues that the definition of a thing resides in its specific form and that its existence implies that it must necessarily occur in such a type of matter (Trueba, 2009). This argument is based on his theory of causes or first principles and his theory of definition, where he mentions that it must state the essence of things, which does not occur separately from matter. Both theories are linked to his hylomorphic conception of reality (Trueba, 2009). Therefore, for the Stagirite, emotions are generated in the soul and are accompanied by pleasure and pain; the question of the soul does not arise in relation to religious beliefs but is incorporated into the explanation of the phenomenon of life from a naturalistic perspective (Garcés & Giraldo, 2017). In correspondence with Garcés & Giraldo (2017), Aristotle adds that all emotions generated in the soul create movement, concluding that the soul also moves.
Aristotle continues reflecting on the soul and points out that the relationship between emotions and movement is not necessary (Garcés & Giraldo, 2017). Although emotional experiences such as sadness, joy, and thought are essentially movements, they all involve being moved. He concludes that the human serves the soul by experiencing these sufferings, considering the soul as the medium through which things are done or felt. Thus, emotions develop as movements in the soul, sometimes originating there and other times directed towards it. This approach emphasizes that emotions are not merely psychic sensations but also somatic (Garcés & Giraldo, 2017). According to Trueba (2009), this is demonstrated by the fact that sometimes, despite violent and palpable excitations, neither anger nor fear is generated, while on other occasions, under the influence of small and imperceptible excitements, commotion occurs.
The Essence of Pleasure and Pain
Aristotle argues that passions are often accompanied by sensations of pleasure and/or pain, implying some psychophysical disturbance or alteration (Trueba, 2009). For instance, pleasures and pains are often accompanied by warmth and cold in some part or throughout the body. Consequently, sensations of pleasure and pain play a crucial role in Aristotle's conception of emotions. Therefore, sensations of pleasure and pain hold a relevant place in Aristotle's conception of emotions. In the "Nicomachean Ethics," emotions are primarily defined as affections accompanied by pleasure or pain. For example, according to Trueba (2009), Aristotle names passions such as desire, anger, fear, boldness, envy, joy, goodness, hatred, longing, stimulation, compassion, and, in general, all affections linked to pleasure or pain.
The above definition bears a resemblance to the commentary in "Rhetoric," although it does not constitute a general definition of emotions (Trueba, 2009). For Aristotle, emotions are what motivate people to change their judgments and become fickle, as pain and pleasure derive from them. However, they are not isolated traits but complementary: people change their minds due to the pleasure or pain they experience in their emotions, simultaneously feeling pleasure or pain along with the judgment they make (Cruz, 2012). Now, to understand each emotion, it is necessary to distinguish three aspects: the state of those experiencing the emotion, those to whom the emotion is usually directed, and the circumstances (Garcés & Giraldo, 2017). According to Garcés & Giraldo (2017), if only one or two of these aspects are considered, but not all, the emotion cannot be inspired.
On the other hand, the relationship between passions and sensations of pleasure and pain is a relevant aspect of the psychophysical nature of emotions that has generated discussions (Trueba, 2009). Aristotle takes up Plato's conception of emotions as mixed affections accompanied by pleasure and pain in his treatise "Rhetoric." However, in the "Nicomachean Ethics," he does not emphasize the mixed nature of emotions as much. The difference goes beyond a simple matter of emphasis, as Aristotle's thesis appears formulated significantly differently in the "Nicomachean Ethics." According to Trueba (2009), the conjunction serves as a basis to consider that Aristotle does not imply that emotions in general involve both sensations in all cases.
On one hand, it is clear that not all emotions involve a combination of pleasure and pain (Trueba, 2009). Some, such as compassion, shame, fear, envy, and indignation, are defined as painful affections. Shame is defined as regret related to past, present, or future vices, leading to a loss of reputation. On the other hand, Aristotle argues that hatred, unlike anger, does not entail distress or pain, contradicting Plato's idea of emotions as mixed affections. Thus, "Rhetoric" defines many emotions as forms of sorrow or pain, although some of these may be accompanied by pleasure, such as fear with the hope of salvation or anger with the possibility and desire for revenge. This does not mean that the pleasures accompanying these painful affections are indeed an ingredient in them in the sense of mixed feelings. According to Trueba (2009), instead of describing emotions as a mixture of pleasure and pain, one should speak of mixtures of emotions.
Emotions and Beliefs
Many of Aristotle's definitions of emotions are linked to specific opinions or beliefs (Trueba, 2009). He argues that certain judgments trigger particular emotions, while other judgments exclude certain emotions (Trueba, 2009). For example, people do not make the same judgments when experiencing sadness or happiness, or when experiencing love compared to hatred (Quintanilla, 2007). For Aristotle, beliefs are so fundamental to emotions that the criterion for their distinction lies precisely in the distinctive beliefs associated with them. For instance, in correspondence with Quintanilla (2007), the distinction between fear and sadness lies in the fact that, in the former case, the person believes they will face great harm, while in the latter case, the person believes they have already experienced significant harm, either to themselves or to another person.
References
Cruz, M. (2012). Aristoteles y Las Emociones. 1library.co. Recuperado 6 July 2021, a partir de https://1library.co/document/zlvx45gy-aristoteles-y-las-emociones.html
Garcés, L., & Giraldo, C. (2017). Emociones en Aristóteles: Facultades anímicas en la formación de las opiniones y de los juicios. Redalyc.org. Recuperado 6 July 2021, a partir de https://www.redalyc.org/journal/4137/413755833007/html/
Garcés, L., & Giraldo, C. (2017). Las emociones y las pasiones en Aristóteles: conceptualización e interpretación. Revistaespacios.com. Recuperado 6 July 2021, a partir de https://www.revistaespacios.com/a18v39n04/a18v39n04p26.pdf
Quintanilla, P. (2007). LA CONQUISTA ARISTOTÉLICA DE LAS EMOCIONES. Spp.com.pe. Recuperado 6 July 2021, a partir de http://spp.com.pe/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Quintanilla_5.pdf
Trueba, C. (2009). La teoría aristotélica de las emociones. Scielo.org.mx. Recuperado 6 July 2021, a partir de http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1665-13242009000200007
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