Does learning occur through experimentation with the environment or through reflection and introspection? This question reflects the main topic that, during the Enlightenment, served as a key differentiator to distinguish between the major types of philosophers: the rationalists, who argued that knowledge is derived through reason, and the empiricists, who believed that the intellect develops through experience (Torres, 2017). Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 - 1716), however, did not fit into either of these two categories. Torres (2017) mentions that, despite more than 300 years having passed since his death, his ideas can still serve today to approximately and intuitively understand how reality is experienced.
The Monads
Leibniz acknowledges that although the unraveling of notions could serve to discover the truth, in practice this proves to be an impossible task, as human rationality does not possess sufficient power to process such a magnitude of information (Torres, 2017). However, this does not imply that every element of the universe is devoid of fragments of the truth. In fact, according to Leibniz, the universe is composed of units called monads, which are metaphysical entities that harbor representations of everything that exists. According to Torres (2017), being true and encompassing the past, present, and future, a monad is identical to any other, as all coincide in containing the truth.
Ideas and Knowledge
Leibniz's epistemology begins with the distinction between clear and obscure ideas (Glowienka, n.d.). An idea is clear when it allows the recognition of the represented thing, and obscure when it does not. For example, if someone has seen a gerbil, they can have an idea of what a gerbil is. However, if the next time they encounter a small rodent they cannot determine whether it is a gerbil or a hamster, then they only have an obscure idea of "gerbil." Leibniz classifies clear ideas into two categories: confused and distinct. A clear idea is also distinct when all the marks or criteria that distinguish that idea from others can be cataloged. An animal physiologist can differentiate and enumerate the common characteristics of all rodents and the unique ones of gerbils. According to Glowienka (n.d.), a child with a pet gerbil might not be able to do this and thus would have a clear but confused idea.
Leibniz further classifies clear and distinct ideas as adequate or inadequate (Glowienka, n.d.). If one has an adequate idea, they have a clear and distinct understanding not only of the idea in question but also of all its parts and components. One has a clear and distinct knowledge "to the end" of the primitive concepts that compose the idea. Leibniz admits that he is unsure if any human possesses an adequate idea, but considers that arithmetic knowledge almost approaches adequacy. According to Glowienka (n.d.), in all other cases where exhaustive analysis to primitive concepts cannot be carried out, one has clear, distinct, but inadequate ideas.
At its highest reaches, Leibniz mentions that knowledge is not only adequate but also intuitive (Glowienka, n.d.). Intuitive knowledge is adequate and non-discursive. This means that a person knows clearly and precisely all the components of an idea and understands them simultaneously. In correspondence with Glowienka (n.d.), in the case of all adequate knowledge, intuitive knowledge seems more appropriate for divine knowers than for humans, since the latter cannot think of all the components of a complex concept simultaneously.
A consequence of his taxonomy of knowledge is that it provides a means to explain sensory perception (Glowienka, n.d.). Given his idealism, everything that exists in the world are monads and their mental states. Bodies are phenomena and thus are not sources of knowledge. So, what is sensory perception? Is there any difference between sensation and intellect if all ideas arise from the concept of a monad itself, without interaction between monads? Leibniz points out that what is experienced as sensory perceptions are confused ideas. Even if they are clear, sensory perceptions are necessarily confused. Glowienka (n.d.) mentions that although these perceptions arise spontaneously, they express the harmony between a given monad and all others; thus, it is impossible to enumerate all the factors that contribute to the perception of any given sense, most of which fall below the threshold of consciousness.
With the category of clear and confused ideas, Leibniz can meaningfully preserve the distinction between sensation and intellection without compromising the basic principles of his idealism (Glowienka, n.d.). His approach to ideas and knowledge distinguishes him in some key aspects from his 17th-century rationalist peers. The division between distinction and adequacy leads him to differentiate between nominal and real definitions. Nominal definitions include distinct knowledge; they sufficiently identify the defining marks of a concept. However, in correspondence with Glowienka (n.d.), they do not guarantee that the concept is possible. It might be that a concept is internally inconsistent, a fact that would be revealed if one had adequate knowledge of all its parts.
The Idea of Notions
Leibniz was convinced that every component of reality, whether it be an individual, a landscape, or an object, is linked to a concept known as a "notion" (Torres, 2017). A "notion" is understood to be everything that can be asserted as true about the component of reality to which it is associated. To illustrate this concept, Torres (2017) mentions that the color of a raven is black and that the hind limbs of this animal lack feathers, among other aspects.
Everything is Connected
Leibniz, a thinker deeply influenced by rationalism, held the belief that language should aspire to emulate mathematics, a hermetic system of symbols (Torres, 2017). From his perspective, if something is true, it must be intrinsically connected with the truths of other elements of reality, which are described by their respective notions, at least from a theoretical standpoint. In this way, if the relationships between different notions are discovered, a comprehensive knowledge of reality will be obtained. Essentially, a notion not only contains truths about the element it is associated with, but it also provides information about all the elements it relates to. As an illustration of this concept, Torres (2017) mentions that if a being has feathers covering the fingers of its lower limbs, it cannot be a crow.
Innate Ideas
Leibniz is typically placed in the camp of rationalists, in opposition to empiricists like John Locke (Look, 2020). Although there are arguments to question this distinction, Leibniz fits the description in two aspects: he is a rationalist to the extent that he adheres to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and he is a rationalist to the extent that he accepts innate ideas and rejects the notion that the mind is a tabula rasa. Regarding Leibniz's classical loyalties, it is interesting to note that, in the realm of metaphysics, he often expressed his philosophy in Aristotelian and scholastic terms, but in the realm of epistemology, he was quite openly a Platonist, at least in terms of the existence of innate ideas. In fact, according to Look (2020), in the initial passages of his "New Essays on Human Understanding," his commentary on a book about Locke's "Essay on Human Understanding," Leibniz aligns with Plato on the fundamental issue of the origin of ideas.
Leibniz has a series of direct metaphysical reasons for rejecting the idea that the mind could be a tabula rasa (Look, 2020). First, since there can be no genuine causal interaction between substances, there could be no way for all ideas to come from experience; in fact, no idea could, strictly speaking, come from experience. But secondly, Leibniz believes that the view that minds are blank slates at birth violates the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. In short, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles works against qualitatively identical physical atoms and against qualitatively identical souls (because they are blank). But how could experience and the senses provide the ideas? Does the soul have windows? Is it similar to writing tablets or wax? Clearly, according to Look (2020), those who have this view of the soul are treating it as fundamentally corporeal.
Locke was famous for entertaining the possibility of "thinking matter," and Leibniz found such a thesis abominable (Look, 2020). Throughout his career, Leibniz expressed no doubt that the mind or soul is essentially immaterial, and Locke's skepticism about the nature of substance fundamentally disagrees with Leibniz's deepest philosophical commitments. However, the consequence of this was that Leibniz sought to undermine Locke's position regarding the origin and nature of ideas. According to Look (2020), Leibniz has an argument for the immateriality of the mind or against its mechanism, which referred to the nature of thought and ideas.
This is his famous metaphor of a mill, which appears both in the "New Essays" and in the "Monadology" (Look, 2020). Perceptions could not be explained in mechanical or materialistic terms (Look, 2020). Even if a machine were created to which thought and the presence of perceptions were attributed, inspection of the interior of this machine would not reveal the experience of thoughts or perceptions, but only the movements of various parts. However, according to Look (2020), although Leibniz accepted the common way of speaking, that is, as if the senses were causally responsible for some ideas, he had arguments against the empirical claim that the senses were the origin of all ideas.
According to Leibniz, while the empirical position could explain the source of contingent truths, it could not explain the origin and character of necessary truths (Look, 2020). Because the senses could never reach the universality of any necessary truth; they could, at best, provide the means to make a relatively strong induction. Rather, it was understanding itself that was the source of such truths and that guaranteed their necessity. Look (2020) mentions that, although people are not aware of all ideas, a fact demonstrated by the function and role of memory, certain ideas or truths were in the mind as dispositions or tendencies.
This was what was understood by an innate idea or an innate truth (Look, 2020). In fact, Leibniz believed that the mind had a "special affinity" for necessary truths. On this topic, Leibniz used a distinctive metaphor: a piece of marble had veins that indicated or were arranged to indicate shapes that a skilled sculptor could discover and exploit. Similarly, according to Look (2020), there was a disposition, an aptitude, a preformation, that determined our soul and made necessary truths derivable from it.
Truths of Reason and Truths of Fact
The existence of monads does not change the fact that individuals are not capable of assimilating their presence, and in practice, they often act as if nothing is certain (Torres, 2017). Although humans can access simple truths through mathematics, this does not allow them to make the leap to a complete understanding of what is true and authentic; they simply remain at that point, with that small portion of reality that establishes that the sum of one and one equals two. That is why, according to Torres (2017), Leibniz makes a distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact.
In the case of a truth of reasoning, its reason or explanation can be discovered through the analysis of notions or concepts, resolving into simpler ideas and simpler truths until reaching the primitives (Look, 2020). Ultimately, all truths of reasoning will resolve into primitives or identities, and the Principle of Contradiction is therefore operative. In the case of a truth of fact, on the other hand, its reason cannot be discovered through a finite process of analysis or resolution of notions. However, there must be a reason why some particular fact is so and not otherwise, and, according to Leibniz, this reason is found outside the series of contingent things (Look, 2020). According to Torres (2017), the only entity that has total access to the truths of reason would be the Christian God.
Apperception, Memory, and Reason
The hierarchy of monads has a corollary in its epistemology (Look, 2020). Monads are more or less perfect depending on the clarity of their perceptions, and one monad is dominant over another when it contains reasons for what happens in the other. However, some monads can rise to the level of souls when, for example, they experience sensations, that is, when their perceptions are very distinct and accompanied by memory. Additionally, some souls are in a position to engage in apperception, that is, to reflect on their internal states or perceptions. According to Look (2020), it is important to distinguish between perception, which is the internal state of the monad representing external things, and apperception, which is the consciousness or reflective knowledge of this internal state, something that does not occur to all souls, nor at all times to a given soul.
The point Leibniz wants to make is clearly anti-Cartesian: it is not the case that animals lack souls and are mere machines (Look, 2020). According to Look (2020), there is a continuum from God, angels, and human beings through animals to stones and the opaque monads underlying the dirt and grime of the world; and this continuum should be understood not only in terms of the comparative clarity of the mind's perceptions but also in terms of the types of mental activity possible for a particular being.
What makes human beings and higher minds special is the ability, through perception, to formulate a conception of the self (Look, 2020). Indeed, Leibniz suggests that rationality itself derives from the capacity for reflection. Rationality, however, is actually just the ability to form indubitable connections of ideas and follow them to their infallible consequences. In other words, according to Look (2020), animals and most human beings are purely empirical; a rational person, however, is one who can engage in genuine a priori reasoning, moving from the knowledge of a true cause through deduction to necessary effects.
Small Perceptions
One of the theses of his philosophy is that each substance expresses the entire universe (Look, 2020). In order to incorporate this thesis into his general epistemology and philosophy of mind, he develops his account of "small perceptions" or "tiny perceptions." At every moment, there are countless perceptions in people, unaccompanied by consciousness or reflection; that is, alterations in the soul itself, of which they are not aware because these impressions are very small and quite numerous, or too invariant, so they are not distinctive enough on their own. In other words, according to Look (2020), everything that takes place in the universe is indeed expressed by every finite mind, but the infinite perceptions present in the mind, from the flight of the butterfly in the Amazon jungle to the waddling of the penguin in Antarctica, are often tiny or too indistinct to overcome, for example, the appearance of this computer screen or the sensation of hunger.
The infinity of small perceptions is, then, simply epistemological white noise (Look, 2020). The simplicity and unity of the mind still allow for the multiplicity of perceptions and appetites. However, this multiplicity should not only be interpreted as diachronic, but also as synchronic; that is, the mind, despite its simplicity and unity, contains within it at any given moment an infinity of different small perceptions. An individual in a state of wakefulness is aware of particular perceptions, but never of all. In correspondence with Look (2020), the mind is always active, since there are always perceptions present in it, even if those perceptions are tiny and do not rise to a level where people are conscious of them.
References
Glowienka, E. W. (s. f.). Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosofy. Recuperado 31 de marzo de 2024, de https://iep.utm.edu/leib-ove/
Look, B.C. (2020). Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. En E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/leibniz/
Torres, A. (2017, julio 18). La Teoría Epistemológica de Gottfried Leibniz. Psicología y Mente. https://psicologiaymente.com/psicologia/teoria-epistemologica-gottfried-leibniz
