In Descartes' work, freedom emerges as a fundamental thesis, although it often receives less attention than other aspects of his philosophy (Christofidou, 2009). Nevertheless, the treatment and importance that Descartes gives to freedom confer a sense of sublimity to his conception and a certain serenity to his conception of man. According to Christofidou (2009), in this vision, the human being is presented as a rational, autonomous, irreducible, and substantially real being.
Free Will
Free will manifests as an expression of knowledge that emerges from the understanding of innate ideas, which originate from God (Astore, 2016). René Descartes, the French philosopher, corroborated that the existence of free will is based on the inherent capacity of humans to reject or abstain from actions they perceive as contrary to their nature. Therefore, according to Astore (2016), people exercise their free will by choosing not to do what is unpleasant to them, implying that free will can be considered a faculty at the service of the mind, providing the possibility not only to discern the truth but also to forge a unique, autonomous, and genuine identity.
Free will is essential for individuals to recognize their uniqueness, as by being aware of their freedom, they can chart a life path aligned with the truth, which derives from a proper understanding of the cause of their freedom, that is, God (Astore, 2016). He also considered free will to be a fully known concept because, without it, people could not form a notion of their own freedom; however, this is not the case, since humans are aware of their freedom and have the capacity to conceive an idea of it, which, according to Astore (2016), is because God has imprinted the necessary clarity in the human mind to understand free will and has allowed people to know the extent of their freedom, since the innate knowledge of the ability to be free is sufficient for life, being a reflection of divine perfection.
Therefore, the perfection of God, as the cause of the human mind and thus the faculty of free will, is not imperfect but directed towards what is true and good (Astore, 2016). In this way, it can be inferred that, for Descartes, free will is intrinsically linked to reason, in the sense that an increase in knowledge can make a person more aware of their capacity to be free. Ultimately, according to Astore (2016), this recognition is achieved through the conscious decision to cultivate the mental ability to reaffirm freedom, acting consistently in a way that reflects an ethical will.
Freedom and Will
For Descartes, the freedom of the will is a palpable reality, characterized by the capacity to generate one's own will (Astore, 2016). This freedom is based on the mind's ability to make autonomous decisions, provided it understands the cause of its existence. For Descartes, as the knowledge about the nature of the principles that can originate certain phenomena, such as moral acts, deepens, the understanding and capacity to make ethical decisions in a decisive and logical manner are strengthened. In short, Descartes advocates the idea that humans can perfect their ability to be free through the use of reason, which, in turn, increases their potential to act freely (Astore, 2016). According to Christofidou (2009), only through this process is it possible to distance oneself from ingrained customs, habits, lack of reflection, and preconceived notions.
Freedom and the Degrees of Freedom
René Descartes firmly believed that freedom consists in the power of choice, in the ability to determine oneself to want something without a prior decision; thus, for the philosopher, freedom is manifested in the selection of what the understanding identifies as good and true (Rodríguez, 2019). In this sense, according to Christofidou (2009), Descartes highlights two fundamental and connected aspects in his vision of freedom: the difference between indifference and spontaneity, and the idea that there are various degrees of freedom, a notion that distinguishes his perspective from others.
The degrees of freedom are not quantitative but qualitative. Freedom can appear in a greater or lesser degree; the highest degree is reached when clear and distinct perceptions of reason generate an inclination of the will towards truth and good, reflecting its essential nature (Christofidou, 2009). It is in this sense that the freedom of the will becomes evident. For Descartes, freedom at its highest degree is not only fundamental for moral law but also for epistemic responsibility. The act of knowing involves making judgments, and for Descartes, making a judgment requires the participation of both understanding and will, as judging goes beyond merely conceiving; it is an action. According to Christofidou (2009), in the case of clear and distinct propositions, the will assents.
On the one hand, he considers that the highest level of freedom is revealed in the theoretical judgments of clear and distinct propositions about the truth (Christofidou, 2009). This highlights the uniqueness of his thesis, as his approach indicates that even from a theoretical perspective, there must be reasons for freedom, whose highest degree is found in its expression and its link to clear and distinct propositions, relating not only to what is good but also to what is true. On the other hand, the lowest level of freedom is expressed in the indifference of the will towards dark or confused perceptions and, therefore, not sufficiently clear and distinct. In such a case, the will can affirm or deny, even in the absence of convincing or sufficient reasons to lean towards one option or another (Christofidou, 2009). According to Margot & Leal (2008), Descartes considers indifference as a consequence of ignorance because if a person knows what is good and true, they cannot remain indifferent.
Freedom and Self-Mastery
The freedom of spontaneity, closely linked to self-mastery, is achieved through intellectual discipline and self-control, emanations of reason in its theoretical and practical facets (Christofidou, 2009). This self-mastery is not achieved by subduing or isolating rebellious passions and instincts, nor by denying them, as doing so would deny the inherent humanity of each individual. According to Christofidou (2009), two categories of instincts are identified: those inherent to the human being, which are reflected in the natural light of reason and its ability to discern the reality of things; and those of animal nature, which drive people towards the preservation and satisfaction of bodily needs.
Self-mastery, therefore, is achieved through the moderation and transformation of passions and instincts of the second category into sensibilities more in line with humanity (Christofidou, 2009). This is accomplished by harmonizing these passions and instincts with the truth and the good, revealed by the reflective capacity of reason. In short, according to Margot & Leal (2008), to achieve autonomy and truly be masters of oneself, it is necessary to exercise control over passions so that behavior aligns with the dictates of reason, avoiding interferences from the body and external elements.
Through the transformation seen as essential for self-mastery, a person can achieve autonomy (Christofidou, 2009). Autonomy is characterized by the capacity of rational beings to act not out of fear of punishment or in search of reward, but as conscious beings and agents of their own will. According to Christofidou (2009), in the world, everything acts according to laws and principles, but only a self-conscious individual is capable of also acting from the recognition and clear understanding of the principles and values of truth and good, being distinctively motivated by logical and rational reasons.
Self-determination
The supreme level of freedom demonstrates that autonomous will is not conditioned by chance or physical causal determinism, but is guided by self-determination that originates from rational motivations (Christofidou, 2009). In this context, human decisions are influenced by an amalgamation of factors that include passions, desires, psychological predispositions, as well as the external environment and social manipulations. These elements are relevant to those who hold that, essentially, all motivations to act are based on calculated interests or for those who question the efficacy of reason. Their interpretation of freedom recognizes these influences but relegates them to a state of indifference and the lowest level of freedom. This level manifests in a range that goes from selfishness to error, fault, and sin. Christofidou (2009) points out that indifference and lack of clarity are constant whenever the opportunity to act incorrectly arises.
References
Astore, R. A. (2016). Examining Free-Will Through Spinoza and Descartes. Inquiries Journal. Recuperado 27 de noviembre de 2021, de http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1354/examining-free-will-through-spinoza-and-descartes
Christofidou, A. (2009). Descartes on Freedom, Truth, and Goodness. Noûs. Recuperado 27 de noviembre de 2021, de http://people.tamu.edu/~sdaniel/682%20Readings/christofidou%20freedom.pdf
Margot, J. P., & Leal, Y. (2008). La libertad de pensamiento en la moral cartesiana. Redalyc. Recuperado 27 de noviembre de 2021, de https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/478/47803004.pdf
Rodríguez, A. (2019). René Descartes y la Escuela Cartesiana. Universidad Metropolitana. Recuperado 27 de noviembre de 2021, de https://www.unimet.edu.ve/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Descartes-ARI-pub.pdf
